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Abstract  
The corporate opportunity doctrine was introduced into China for the first time under the 
Chinese Company law 2005 as one of the fiduciary duties imposed on directors and senior 
managers of a company. This paper assesses the application of this doctrine by comparison 
with its English counterpart. It is argued that the current rules are theoretical and further reforms 
are required to clarify and broaden its scope of application.  
 
Introduction  
 
The corporate opportunity doctrine was introduced into China for the first time under the 
Chinese Company Law 2005 (the “CCL 2005”) as one of the fiduciary duties of directors and 
senior managers. Art 149(5) provides that “Directors and senior managers, without the 
approval of shareholder meeting, must not take advantage of their positions to acquire business 
opportunities for themselves or any other person, or to engage in business identical to the 
company’s business for the benefit of themselves or any other person”. Directors and senior 
managers are therefore prohibited from seeking company’s opportunity unless it is approved 
by the shareholder meeting1.  
 
This paper assesses the application of the nascent corporate opportunity doctrine in China by 
comparison with its well-established English counterpart. Section 1 considers directors’ 
general duties in China, including the duty of loyalty and the duty of diligence. Section 2 
evaluates the scope of application of the corporate opportunity doctrine under Art 149 of the 
CCL 2005; in particular, whether its application should be extended to supervisors and 
controlling shareholders. Section 3 examines recent cases and analyses the standards which 
have been used by Chinese Judiciary in determining whether the corporate opportunity doctrine 
has been breached. Section 4 analyses the corporate opportunity doctrine in England at 
1 Chinese Company Law 2005, Art 149 (5). 
1 
 
                                                          
common law and under section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 (the “CA 2006”).  It is 
concluded that the introduction of corporate opportunity doctrine in China is of great 
significance in enhancing directors’ duties and improving the protection of the company’s 
interests; however, the current law provides only a basic theoretical framework. It is argued 
that its scope of application needs to be broadened; the circumstances where corporate 
opportunity is abused should be more clearly defined; and the power of authorisation should 
be granted to the board of directors in addition to shareholder meeting.  
 
1. Directors’ duties in China  
 
Directors owe the duty of loyalty and the duty of diligence to their company under the CCL 
2005; however, neither duty is well defined. The Chinese Company Law 1993 (the “CCL 
1993”), which was replaced by the CCL 2005, introduced the concept of a director’s duty of 
loyalty to the company in order to ensure that directors acted in good faith and loyalty in 
managing a company.2  It required directors to faithfully perform their duties and maintain the 
interests of the company, and not to take advantage of their positions for personal benefits.3  
This was similar to the concept of directors’ fiduciary duties in England;4 however, there was 
no clear definition of “faithfully” or “the interests of the company”.  Both directors and 
shareholders therefore did not have a clear concept of what directors were required to do whilst 
the courts and judges found it difficult to enforce these duties in practice.5   
The CCL 2005 has not resolved these inadequacies to any great extent. Directors now owe a 
duty of loyalty to the company and they must comply with laws, administrative regulations and 
the articles of association. 6  Article 148 states that “A director shall abide by laws, 
administrative regulations and articles of association of the company and shall have the 
fiduciary and diligent duties to the company.” Art 149 simply aggregates the previous 
provisions under the CCL 1993 7  by providing a detailed list of activities that directors, 
supervisors and senior managers are not allowed to engage in, such as misappropriating 
2 Directors’ duties in limited liability companies are listed in Articles 59-63 of the CCL 1993 which also apply to directors in 
joint stock companies: CCL 1993 art 123.  
3 CCL 1993 art 59  
4 Ping Jiang & Liufang Fang, Company Law [Gongsi Fa] (Law Press, 2003), p.213. 
5 Jinzhu Yang, “The Role of Shareholders in Enforcing Directors’ Duties: A Comparative Study of the UK and China: Part 1” 
(2006) 17 I.C.C.L.R 318, 326. 
6 CCL2005 art 148. 
7 CCL 1993, articles 60-62. 
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company’s funds or depositing the company’s funds into an account in his own or other’s 
name8. They are prohibited from self-dealings; for example, they should not, in violation of the 
company’s articles of association or without the consent of the shareholder meeting or the 
board of directors, enter into contracts or carry out transactions with the company9. Similarly, 
they should not take advantage of their position to acquire business opportunities for himself 
or any other person, or to engage in business identical to the company’s business for the benefit 
of themselves or any other person (the corporate opportunity doctrine)10. They should not lend 
the company’s fund to others or provide any guarantee to any other person by using the 
company’s property 11 . Moreover, they are prohibited from taking commissions on the 
transactions between their company and others, or disclosing the company’s secrets without 
permission12. Above all, a catch-all provision is included in Art 149 (8) where directors and 
senior managers are refrained from undertaking “other acts that breach their duty of loyalty”. 
It is argued that the duty of loyalty, although similar to the concept of fiduciary duty in England, 
is not clearly defined in China; further judicial interpretations are required to clarify the 
meaning and the scope of this duty.  
The duty of diligence is of great importance for the protection of the interests of shareholders 
and the company. As directors have discretion to propose business strategies and prepare 
reports for shareholder meetings, it may easily lead to their misuse of power and an 
infringement of shareholders’ interests without such duty. Directors’ duty of diligence did not 
exist under the CCL 1993. The CCL 2005 fills this gap by clearly imposing such duty on 
directors13; however, unlike the duty of loyalty, it fails to address any specific rules, such as 
what the duty of diligence really means and which types of standards should be adopted. It 
does not specifically require directors to have any expertise or knowledge of the company’s 
business, the lack of which would most probably put the company’s interests at risk.   
By contrast, a director must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence under the English 
Companies Act 2006. This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a 
reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in 
8 CCL 2005 art 149(1).  
9 CCL 2005 art 149(4). 
10 CCL 2005 art 149(5).  
11 CCL 2005 art 149(3).  
12 CCL 2005 art 149(6).  
13 CCL 2005 art 148.  
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relation to the company14, and the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director 
has15.  The former sets an objective minimum standard of a reasonably diligent person who has 
taken on the office of director, taking into account of the functions undertaken. The latter sets 
a subjective standard in relation to the personal attributes of the director, which may in some 
circumstances raise the objective minimum standard. 
More detailed guidance is provided at common law on the duty of care, skill and diligence. In 
Re Barings Plc (No.5)16, a number of senior directors failed to supervise a rogue trader within 
the bank, which resulted in a substantial amount of financial loss and the collapse of the bank. 
These directors were found to be unfit and disqualified. It was held that directors, both 
collectively and individually, had a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient 
knowledge of the company’s business to enable them to discharge their duties. Whilst directors, 
subject to the articles of association, are entitled to delegate particular functions to those below 
them in the management chain and to trust their competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, 
the delegation of power does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of 
the delegated functions. It is argued that the English approach, which combines objective and 
subjective standards for this duty, will be of great benefit to Chinese legislators because it has 
been well established and tested in practice over a long period of time. 
 
2. The corporate opportunity doctrine in China: the scope of application 
  
The corporate opportunity doctrine did not exist under the CCL 1993 but directors and 
managers must not undertake business for themselves or others business similar to that of the 
company; any income from such activities should belong to the company (the “no-competing 
rule”)17. The application of this no-competing rule was very strict in the sense that under no 
circumstances could directors and managers undertake business similar to that of their 
company. The breach of this duty did not depend on whether the company had approved it or 
not. The current no-competing rule is contained in Art 149(5) of the CCL 2005 and it is more 
14 CA 2006 section 174(2)(a). 
15 CA 2006 section 174(2)(b). 
16 [2000] 1 BCLC 523. 
17 Art 61(1) of the CCL 1993 provides that “Directors and Managers must not undertake business for themselves or others 
business similar to that of the company. They must not infringe the company’s interests. Any income from the above 
activities belongs to the company”.  
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flexible than its predecessor in the sense that directors, with the approval of the company, can 
compete with the company and undertake similar business.   
The corporate opportunity doctrine was introduced into China under the CCL 2005 and it exists 
alongside the no-competing rule. Corporate opportunity was defined by leading academic Liu 
as the business opportunity that directors or senior managers obtained when they were carrying 
out company’s business. 18  The introduction of corporate opportunity doctrine has great 
implications on the protection of the company’s interests; however, it is argued that the current 
provisions are theoretical and many questions are left unanswered19. For instance, it is unclear 
whether the rule applies to de facto directors, shadow directors, supervisors and controlling 
shareholders. Further guidance is required on how corporate opportunity is defined and in what 
circumstances directors can take advantage of the opportunity. Moreover, it does not give the 
board of directors the power to authorise the potential conflict of interests and directors’ use of 
corporate opportunities.  
 
(1) Directors and Senior Managers  
The current rule on the corporate opportunity doctrine under Art 149 only applies to directors 
and senior managers20. A director refers to de jure director who has been legally appointed and 
there is no detailed classification of directors in China. It indicates that de facto directors and 
shadow directors are not covered by this duty. By comparison, a director under English law is 
more broadly defined and it includes “any person occupying the position of a director, by 
whatever name called.”21 The title is not the determining factor in deciding whether a person 
is a director; a director may appear as a de jure director22 , de facto director23 and shadow 
director24. It is incisively argued by Feng that the corporate opportunity doctrine should extend 
18 Liu Junhai, The Protection of Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies [Gufen Youxian Gongsi Gudongquan de Baohu] 
China Law Press [Zhongguo Falu Chubanshe], 2004], pp 172-173.  
19 Feng Guo, “ A study of Prohibiting the Abuse of Corporate Opportunities” [Jinzhi Cuanduo Gongsi Jihui Guize Tanjiu], 
Chinese Legal Studies [Zhongguo Faxue], 2010, Issue 1, p 96.   
20 “Senior managers” are defined in Art 217 (1) of the CCL 2005.  
21 Section 250, CA 2006. 
22 A de jure director can be appointed by an ordinary resolution at the general meeting. When he is successfully appointed 
his details must be kept at the company’s registered office and also registered at the Companies House. Re CEM Connections 
(2000) BCC 917.  
23 A de facto director has not been formally appointed as such but has undertaken the functions of directors. Re Hydrodam 
(Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 161; Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd [2011] 1 BCLC 141. 
24 A shadow director is defined in s 251(1) of the CA 2006 as a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions 
the directors of a company are accustomed to act. However, a person is not deemed to be a shadow director by reason only 
that the directors act on advice given by him in a professional capacity (s 251(2)). See Secretary of State v Deverell [2000] 
BCC 1057.  
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to de facto and shadow directors who carry out the functions as de jure directors, taking into 
account their important roles in the company25.  
A senior manager is defined as “deputy-manager, finance manager and the director’s secretary 
at listed companies, or others specified in the company’s articles of association.”26 The scope 
of senior manager is clarified in the case of Beijing Jinghua Sifang Trading Ltd v Yu Qian27. 
The defendant Yu Qian was a branch manager of the claimant Jinghua Sifang Ltd. He made a 
profit by introducing the contract which the claimant had cancelled to another company Yibo 
Ltd. It was held that the defendant was not subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine under 
Art 149(5) because the definition of senior manager includes the company’s manager and 
deputy manager who have been appointed by the board of directors or the shareholder meeting. 
It does not include branch managers within the company such as the defendant in this case.  
Another question arises as to whether the corporate opportunity doctrine applies to directors or 
senior managers who have retired or left the company. In England, a director continues to be 
subject to the duty to avoid conflict of interests in relation to company property, information 
or opportunity after he ceases his appointment.28 It prevents a director from taking advantage 
of a situation by simply resigning from the company’s board of directors. Jiang strongly argues 
that the same approach should be followed in China and directors who have left the company 
should still be subject to this duty as long as they came across the information when they were 
directors of the company29. For the purpose of protecting the company’s interests, it is sensible 
to follow the English approach by extending this duty to those who have ceased appointment. 
 
(2) Supervisors    
It is alarming that supervisors are not subject to the fiduciary duties in Art 149 and in particular 
the corporate opportunity doctrine in Art 149 (5), taking into account that they play an 
important role in supervising the board of directors and they also have access to the company’s 
sensitive information and opportunities. The CCL 2005 requires the establishment of 
25 See Feng Guo (2010), p 105.   
26 Art 217 (1), CCL 2005.  
27 [Beijing Jinghua Sifang Maoyi Youxian Gongsi yu Yuqian Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Peichang Jiufen An] 
Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2009), No 13800.  
28 Section 170(2), CA 2006. David Milman, “Legislative Comment Directors and the Transition to the New Regime” (2007) 
Company Law Newsletter, Issue No 8, p.3 
29 Jiang Daxing, “Duties of Directors Who Have Ceased Appointment – The Amendments of Chinese Company Law” 
[Dongshi Liren Yiwu Lifa Guize Yanjiu – Jianlun Woguo Gongsifa zhi Xiugai] (2001) Law Review [Faxue Pinglun], Issue 
No 5.  
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shareholders’ general meetings, a board of directors and a board of supervisors for both limited 
liability companies and joint stock companies in China.30 A general meeting is regarded as the 
supreme organ of authority of a company, with extensive powers to exercise control over the 
company’s affairs.31 The board of directors is responsible for managing the company,32 while 
a board of supervisors has the right to supervise corporate management and the activities of 
directors and managers.33 The two-tier system in China aims to create a hierarchical system 
with a supervisory board above a board of directors in order to put restraints on directors’ power 
and therefore to reduce agency costs.  
 
Supervisors are given many powers; for instance, they are entitled to check the company’s 
financial accounts, propose to dismiss directors or senior managers 34 , propose to hold 
shareholder meeting 35 , and initiate litigation against directors upon the request of 
shareholders.36  In light of their significant roles in maintaining good corporate governance in 
the company, it is correctly argued by Feng that supervisors should not be allowed to take 
advantage of opportunities which belong to the company and therefore the corporate 
opportunity doctrine should equally apply to them.37  This argument was supported by the 
judgment in the case of Liu v Li 38. The defendant Li was a supervisor and Assistant to General 
Manager of Wanpeng Ltd; he had great influence on company’s management decisions. It was 
alleged that the defendant set up another company Fumoxiang Ltd which operated similar 
business to Wanpeng Ltd.  The Court of Appeal held that the defendant, as a supervisor of the 
company, did not breach the corporate opportunity rule because Art 149(5) only applies to a 
director or senior manager. The outcome of this case would be completely different and the 
company’s interests would have been better protected if Art 149 applied to supervisors.  
 
(3) Should the corporate opportunity doctrine apply to controlling shareholders? 
  
30 S Shim, “Corporate Governance Reform in China” (2005) 26 Comp Law 375, 376. 
31 CCL 2005 art 100.  
32 CCL 2005 art 109. 
33 CCL 2005 art 119. 
34 CCL 2005 art 54 (2).  
35 CCL 2005 art 54 (4).  
36 CCL 2005 art 54 (6) and art 152.  
37 See Feng Guo (2010), p 107.  
38 [Liubin yu Li Zhanjun Jianshi Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Jiufen An] Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2010) No 1099. 
7 
 
                                                          
It is clear that the fiduciary duties in Art 149 do not apply to controlling shareholders. 
Controlling shareholders are defined as those who hold more than 50% of the company’s share 
capital and those who have a great influence on the outcome of shareholder resolution even 
though they do not hold a majority of shares of the company39. It is important to impose some 
restrictions on controlling shareholders’ conduct in China, not least for the protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests. This is particularly so due to the shareholding structure in 
many companies which are controlled by majority shareholders. The shareholding structure is 
highly concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders in most joint stock companies, even 
in listed companies.40 Shareholders were generally free to act in their own interests and owed 
no fiduciary duties to other shareholders or the company under the CCL 1993.41 Majority 
shareholders’ interests may be consistent with those of the minority but practical evidence 
suggests the former may try to take advantage of their controlling position, in particular, in 
large joint stock companies.42 A restriction on their conduct therefore is essential to prevent 
their abuse of power and thereby protect the interests of minority shareholders and the company.   
Under the CCL 2005, shareholders, including controlling shareholders, must exercise their 
voting rights according to law. They must not abuse their rights which would infringe the 
interests of the company or other shareholders; otherwise, they will be held liable for 
compensation to the company or shareholders. 43  Specifically, Art 21 stipulates that a 
company’s controlling shareholders, de facto controllers44, directors, supervisors or senior 
officers shall not use their affiliated relationship to harm the interests of the company. They 
will be responsible for compensation if this provision is breached. The duties of controlling 
shareholders therefore have been strengthened to tackle the serious de facto control problems 
and to ease their oppression against minority shareholders. These provisions, however, are very 
general and difficult to apply in practice; for example, the duties in Articles 20 and 21 are not 
specified and the only remedy available is compensation. 
39 CCL 2005 art 217 (2). 
40 Jin Xin, “Listed Companies Shareholding Structure and Corporate Governance” [Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Jiegou Yu 
Gongsi Zhili], China Finance Press [ Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe], 2005.  
41 Guoping Zhang, “The Defects of the Shareholders’ Litigation System in China” [Chuyi Woguo Gudong Susong Zhidu de 
Que yu Shi] (Nanjing Social Science, No.11, 2002).  
42 Sibao Shen &  Jing Jia, “Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China” (2005) 27 Loy.L.A.Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev.223, at 232. 
43 Art 20, CCL 2005. 
44 The de facto controller is defined as a person “who is not a shareholders of a company but controls the company’s act 
through investment relationships, agreements or other arrangements. CCL 2005 art 217(3).  
8 
 
                                                          
In addition to the fiduciary duties in the CCL 2005, it is clearly started in the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China45 that controlling shareholders in a listed company 
owe fiduciary duties to the company and other shareholders; they must not make profits by 
taking advantage of their positions in the company 46 . More precisely, the controlling 
shareholders of listed companies are prohibited from engaging with similar or identical 
business with that of their companies47. It is suggested that controlling shareholders should be 
subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine under the CCL 2005 in order to effectively protect 
the interests of companies. Further judicial interpretations are therefore needed to extend the 
scope of application of this doctrine. 
 
3. The application of corporate opportunity doctrine in China - case analysis  
 
According to the research carried out by Hou48, a total of ten cases were decided in China 
between 2006 and 201149 where directors or senior managers were sued for taking advantage 
of corporate opportunities. Only two50 out of these ten cases were successful. In those eight 
unsuccessful cases, the courts in two cases held that the claimant company had lost the business 
opportunity51; the court in one case held that the business opportunity did not belong to the 
company52; it was held in other cases that the claimant could not provide sufficient evidence 
45 [Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze], Issued by  China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Economic and Trade 
Commission on 7th January 2001. 
46 Art 19 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China states that “The controlling shareholders owe 
a duty of good faith towards the listed company and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed company 
shall strictly comply with laws and regulations while exercising their rights as investors, and shall be prevented from 
damaging the listed company’s or other shareholders’ legal rights and interests, through means such as assets restructuring, 
or from taking advantage of their privileged position to gain additional benefit”. 
47 Art 27 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China provides that “A listed company’s business 
shall be completely independent from that of its controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries 
shall not engage in the same or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling shareholders shall adopt efficient 
measures to avoid competition with the listed company”. 
48 Hou Huaixia, “The Judicial Application of ‘Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ in China” [Woguo ‘Jinzhi  Cuanduo Gongsi 
Jihui Yuanze’ Sifa Shiyong Yanjiu] Studies in Law and Business [Fa Shang Yanjiu], 2012, Issue No 4, p 149.  
49 The cases were collected between 1 January 2006 and 1 November 2011 from two leading databases: 
http://www.lawyee.net/ and http://chinalawinfo.com/.   
50 Wuxi Weiyan Ltd v Xu [Wuxi Weiyan Youxian Gongsi Su Xu Naihong Deng Maimai Hetong Jiufen An] JiangSu Wuxi 
Binhu District People’s Court (2006）No 0810. Fujian Yatong New Technology Ltd v Liu [Fujian Yatong Xin Cailiao Keji 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Liu Daomin Deng Sunhai Gongsi Quanyi Jiufen An], Liaoning Shenyang Intermediate People’s 
Court [2006] No 1. 
51 Liu v Li [Liubin Yu Li Zhanjun Jianshi Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Jiufen An] Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2010) 
No 1099. Ningbo Kejiyuan Xinhua Information Technology Ltd v Xu Lijian et al [Ningbo Keji Yuanqu Xinhua Xinxi Jishu 
Youxian Gongsi Su Xu Lijian Deng Sunhai Gongsi Quanyi An] Ning Bo Yinzhou People’s Court (2007) No 2.  
52 Beijing Jinghua Sifang Trading Ltd v Yu Qian [Beijing Jinghua Sifang Maoyi Youxian Gongsi yu Yuqian Gaoji Guanli 
Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Peichang Jiufen An] Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) No 13800.   
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to prove that the defendant took advantage of corporate opportunity53. Unfortunately none of 
the cases provided any guidance on whether or when a corporate opportunity can be reasonably 
used, for instance, with the approval of shareholder meeting or board meeting.  
As stated above, the claimant company successfully sued its director or senior manager for 
taking advantage of the corporate opportunities in two cases. In Wuxi Weiyan Ltd v Xu, the 
defendant, who was a senior manager of the claimant company, set up his own company and 
transferred the claimant’s properties to himself at an undervalue. It was held that the defendant 
violated the company’s articles of association and conducted transaction with the claimant 
without its approval. As such, the claimant company’s interests were clearly infringed by the 
transaction.54 In Fujian Yatong New Technology Ltd v Liu, the defendant, whist working as 
director of the claimant, set up another company to compete with the claimant over the same 
business. It was held that the defendant had breached the corporate opportunity doctrine under 
Art 149 of the CCL 200555.  
The current cases clearly indicate that the burden of proof lies on the claimant who alleged that 
the defendant infringed the company’s interests by taking advantage of corporate opportunity. 
In the case of Shanghai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Mao, the claimant sued its director, supervisor 
and senior managers for infringing the company’s interests. An important client of the claimant 
terminated the project with it and then started working with another company which was set 
up by the defendants. This case was unsuccessful because the claimant could not provide 
sufficient evidence to prove that the company was incorporated or managed by the 
defendants.56 Similarly, it was alleged in Beijing Zhongming International Logistics Ltd v Tian 
Qiang et al that the defendants incorporated their own company and seized the claimant’s 
business opportunity by conducting the same business as that of the claimant. This case was 
53  Shanghai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v. Mao [Shanghai Shengyao Yiyao Youxian Gongsi Su Mao Mo Dongshi, Jianshi, Gaoji 
Guanli Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Jiufen Peichang An] Shanghai Pudong Xinqu People’s Court (2008) No 3719. Beijing 
Zhongming International Logistics Ltd v. Tian Qiang et al [Beijing Zhongming Guoji Wuliu Youxian Gongsi Yu Tian Qiang, 
Wei Xiaoming, Ding Shan, O Yang Qi Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Jiufen An] Beijing No 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2009), No 
02263. Ningbo Dahongying Pharmaceutical Supply Ltd v. Shen Yongren Director and Senior Manager [Ningbo Da 
Hongying Yiyao Gongxiao Youxian Gongsi Yu Shen YongRen Gongsi Dongshi, Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi 
Peichang Jiufen Shangsu An] Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court (2009) No 1212; Xuzhou Dakang Electrical 
Control Techonology Ltd v Li Wenhua [Xuzhou Dakang Diankong Keji Youxian Gongsi Yu Li Huawen Deng Sunhai Gongsi 
Liyi Jiufen Shangsu An] Jiangsu Xuzhou Intermediate People’s Court (2010) No 0355. Fujian Yatong New Material 
Technology Ltd v. Liu Daomin et al [Fujian Yatong Xin Cailiao Keji Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Liu Daomin Deng Sunhai 
Gongsi Quanyi Jiufen An] Liaoning Shenyang Intermediate People’s Court [2006] No 1. 
54 [Wuxi Weiyan Youxian Gongsi Su Xu Naihong Deng Maimai Hetong Jiufen An]  JiangSu Wuxi Binhu District People’s 
Court (2006）No 0810. 
55 [Fujian Yatong Xin Cailiao Keji Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Liu Daomin Deng Sunhai Gongsi Quanyi Jiufen An], Liaoning  
Shenyang Intermediate People’s Court [2006] No 1.  
56 [Shanghai Shengyao Yiyao Youxian Gongsi Su Mao Mo Dongshi, Jianshi, Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi 
Jiufen Peichang An] Shanghai Pudong Xinqu People’s Court (2008) No 3719.  
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unsuccessful mainly because the claimant could not prove that any loss was incurred to the 
claimant. 57  In Beijing Dadao Changsheng Techonology Ltd v Beijing Henhua Tengxin 
Techonology Ltd and Its Senior Managers, the claimant did not have sufficient evidence to 
prove the defendant (who was a senior manager of the claimant) was conducting the same 
business as that of the claimant58. It is concluded from the judgments of these three cases that 
the claimant company bears the burden of proof, which makes it more difficult to hold the 
defendants liable for breach of their fiduciary duties.  
It can be argued that the Chinese judiciary has adopted a less rigid approach to corporate 
opportunity compared to the English counterpart. In Beijing Jinghua Sifang Trading Ltd v Yu 
Qian59, the defendants were senior managers of the claimant. They introduced to another 
company Yibo Ltd the contract which the claimant had withdrawn and in return they received 
a commission of RMB 100,000. The claimant sued the defendants for infringing the company’s 
interests and sought compensation. It was held that the defendants did not take advantage of 
the claimant’s opportunity because they knew the client information about Yibo Ltd before 
their employment with the claimant and they played no substantial part in the claimant’s 
withdrawal of the contract. Similarly, in Ningbo Kejiyuan Xinhua Information Technology Ltd 
v Xuli et al60, the claimant sued the defendants for infringing the company’s interests. The 
claimant terminated the contract with Jiaotou Ltd because it was unable to complete the project. 
The defendants, who were senior managers of the claimant, agreed to work on the same project 
in their own capacity and signed the contract with Jiaotou Ltd. It was held that the defendants 
did not breach their duties under Art 149(5) because the claimant had given up the opportunity; 
as such, the opportunity no longer belonged to the claimant and the defendant did not take 
advantage of the opportunity or infringe the claimant’s interests. This is in stark contrast with 
the English approach61, which is discussed in Section 4 below. If both cases were tried under 
English law, the defendants would most probably be held liable for breaching their fiduciary 
duties under section 175 of the CA 2006, taking into account that they came across the 
57 [Beijing Zhongming Guoji Wuliu Youxian Gongsi Yu Tian Qiang, Wei Xiaoming, Ding Shan, Ou Yang Qi Sunhai Gongsi 
Liyi Jiufen An] Beijing No 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) No 02263.  
58 Beijing Dadao Changsheng Technology Ltd v. Beijing Henghua Tengxin Technology Ltd and its Senior Managers [Beijing 
Dadao Changsheng Keji Youxian Gongsi Su Beijing Henghua Tengxin Keji Youxian Gongsi Deng Gaoji Guanli Renyuan 
Jingye Jinzhi Jiufen An] Beijing Haidian District People’s Court (2009) No 5924.  
59 [Beijing Jinghua Sifang Maoyi Youxian Gongsi yu Yuqian Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Sunhai Gongsi Liyi Peichang Jiufen An] 
Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) No 13800.  
60 [Ningbo Keji Yuanqu Xinhua Xinxi Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Xu Lijian Deng Sunhai Gongsi Quanyi An] Ning Bo 
Yinzhou People’s Court (2007) No 2.  
61 Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461; Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554.  
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information whilst working for the company and that the board’s authorisation was not 
obtained.  
 
4. The corporate opportunity doctrine in England 
 
In England, directors were under the duties to avoid conflicts of interests (no-conflict rule) and 
not to make secret profits from their positions (no secret profit rule) at common law. The courts 
traditionally have taken a strict approach in applying these rules62. In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver63 it was held that the directors should return the profits to the company because they 
had obtained their profits by reason and in the course of the execution of their office as directors. 
It made no difference whether the company itself was incapable of taking up the opportunity. 
A corporate opportunity was regarded as a company’s asset which might not be 
misappropriated by the directors. This rule equally applies to the situations where a director 
came across an opportunity personally instead in his capacity as director. In Industrial 
Development Consultants Ltd (IDC) v Cooley64   Cooley was a managing director of IDC and 
he was actively involved in negotiations with the Eastern Gas Board (EGB) to secure certain 
construction contracts for IDC. It became clear that EGB was not prepared to contract with 
IDC. One year later, Cooley resigned from IDC and took the same contracts offered by EGB. 
It was held that Cooley breached the no secret profit rule and he was liable to account as 
information came to him while he was a managing director of the company. This strict approach 
could deter directors from pursuing their own interests at the expense of the company; 
nevertheless, it has been strongly criticised by Lowry & Edmunds as being too harsh on 
directors and it unduly curbs entrepreneurial freedom to compete with companies65.  
These no-conflict and no-profit rules are now codified in Section 175 of the Companies Act 
2006, which provides that a director must “avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a 
direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict with the interests of the 
company”. Section 175 also applies to the exploitation of any property, information or 
opportunity and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of it. This approach 
62 In Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, Lord Herschell held that “a person in a fiduciary position... is not... entitled to make a profit; 
he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict”. 
63 [1942] 1 All ER 378.  
64 [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
65 Lowry & Edmunds, “The No Conflict- No Profit Rules and the Corporate Fiduciary: Challenging the Orthodoxy of 
Absolutism” [2000] Journal of Business Law 122. 
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aims to prevent directors from pursuing their own interests at the expense of their company. It 
appears that the courts still take a strict approach towards the corporate opportunity doctrine66; 
nevertheless, such a rigorous approach is moderated by the potential authorisation by the board 
of directors and the ratification of a breach of such duties by the shareholder meeting.  
Compared with the strict English approach, a more relaxed and flexible approach to the 
corporate opportunity doctrine is adopted in other common law jurisdictions such as Canada 
and Australia. The courts would consider the line of business of the particular company and 
the good faith of the director in question when determining whether or not a director has 
misappropriated a corporate opportunity67. A few English court decisions have also shown 
support for a flexible approach.  In Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna68, the managing 
director had resigned due to dissatisfaction with the company before the completion of 
transaction complained of. He then set up his own company and secured a new contract for it 
regarding the same transaction.  It was held that no conflicts of interests occurred and the 
director was allowed to keep the profit. Hutchinson J held that it was plainly in the public 
interest that directors should be free to exploit an opportunity in a new position. Similarly it 
was held in Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd69 that a director did not breach his fiduciary 
duty by setting up a business in competition with his former company after his resignation, 
even where the intention to commence business was formed prior to the resignation. This more 
relaxed approach may promote the business activities but at the same time there is a greater 
risk of the company being exploited by its own directors.  
This duty to avoid conflicts of interest is not infringed if the transaction has been effectively 
authorised by disinterested directors70 or if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely 
to give rise to a conflict of interest71. There is no need to gain shareholders’ approval prior to 
entering into transactions with third parties where the interests of directors conflict with those 
of the company.  Authorisation is effective only if the following two conditions are met72. 
Firstly, the director in question or any other interested director is not counted towards the 
quorum and any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is considered 
66  Prentice, “The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine” [1974] MLR 464; Prentice & Payne, “The Corporate Opportunity 
Doctrine” (2004) 120 LQR 198; Lowry, “Judicial Pragmatism: Directors’ Duties and Post-resignation Conflicts of Duty” 
[2008] JBL 83. 
67 Peso Silver Mines v Cropper (1966) 58 DLR (2d)1; Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 52 ALJR 399.   
68 [1986] BCLC 460.  
69 [1990] FSR 385.  
70 CA 2006 section 175(4)(b).  
71 CA 2006 section 175(4)(a)..  
72 CA 2006 section 175(6). 
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is met. Second, the matter was agreed to without counting the votes by the director in question 
or any other interested director. There are different rules for private companies and public 
companies. In a private company, authorisation may be given by the directors if nothing in the 
company’s constitution invalidates such authorization73. In a public company, authorization 
may take place where its constitution enables the directors to authorise the matter and the matter 
is proposed to and authorised by them in accordance with the constitution74.  
 
Furthermore, a director, who breached his duty under s 175, will not be liable to return the 
profits if the breach has been ratified by a company’s resolution75. Where the resolution is 
proposed at a meeting, it is passed only if the necessary majority is obtained disregarding votes 
in favour of the resolution by the director (if he is a member of the company) and any member 
connected with him76. The director or any such member is not prevented from attending, being 
counted towards the quorum and taking part in the meeting where the decision is considered. 
By contrast, the approval of shareholder meeting is required for authorising directors’ conflict 
of interests under Chinese company law77. It is argued that the board of directors should be 
entitled to approve the potential conflict of interests since it may be more costly and time-
consuming to hold a shareholder meeting.  The different rules on authorisation in England for 
private companies and public companies should also be considered for adoption in future 
Chinese law reforms in light of the different natures of these companies.  
 
Conclusion  
 
It is a great step forward by introducing the corporate opportunity doctrine into directors’ 
fiduciary duties in China; however, the current rules merely provide a basic legal framework 
and they are insufficient to deter directors from seizing corporate opportunities for their 
personal interests. In terms of the scope of application, it only applies to directors and senior 
managers; supervisors and controlling shareholders are not covered. Moreover, the concept of 
director does not take into account de facto directors and shadow directors. It is recommended 
73 CA 2006 section 175(5). 
74 Ibid.  
75 CA 2006 section 239(2).  
76 CA 2006 section 239(4).  
77 CCL 2005 art 149.  
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that, in order to maximize the protection for a company’s interests, the scope of application 
should be extended and that the classification of different types of directors under English law 
should be considered for its introduction into Chinese law.  
The analysis of recent cases in China indicates that, by comparison with the English counterpart, 
the courts have taken a more relaxed approach in identifying whether a director has taken 
advantage of corporate opportunities. Only in very few cases were the defendants held liable 
for breaching the corporate opportunity doctrine. This is partly due to the fact that the burden 
of proof is placed solely on the claimant company. The standards used for determining 
corporate opportunity should also be further clarified. It is proposed that future Judicial 
Interpretations should be drafted to improve the corporate opportunity doctrine in China as a 
way of more effectively protecting the company’s interests. At the same time, it is essential to 
strike a proper balance between business morality and business efficiency; as such, the 
circumstances for reasonable use of corporate opportunity should be clearly defined.  
In terms of authorisation, only shareholder meeting can approve the use of corporate 
opportunities by directors and senior managers in China. This may be impractical as the 
procedure for holding such meeting is cumbersome and lengthy. It is argued that the board of 
directors should be entitled to authorise the actual and potential conflict of interests and the use 
of corporate opportunities. The different requirements for authorisation in private and public 
companies under English law should be considered for future Chinese legislation reforms.   
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